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The purpose of this paper is to define euthanas,ia, give a brief
outline of the history of the idea and practice, recognize some of the
reasons it has become a current topic for controversy, and acquaint the
reader with the multiplicity of factors that emerge in discussions on
euthanasia. Perspectives from the medical, psychological, legal and
moral realms will be advanced in the text. In the conclusion, each
of these perspectives will be evaluated as to the validity of its .~
assertions and its place within the framework on which to base decisions concerning euthanasia.

A STUDY OF EUTHANASIA

Introduction
There seems to be much confusion regarding the issue of euthanasia.

This confusion probably is the result of a variety of reasons,

one being that a precise definition is often not made at the beginning
of the debate and, therefore, not everyone involved is discussing the
same issue.

It is also very difficult to construct the complete pic-

ture regarding euthanasia due to the fact that it can be viewed on so
many different levels and requires the attention of so many different
communities--doctors, nurses, theologians, ethicists and philosophers,
to name a few.

A third contributing factor that can account for this

confusion is that euthanasia lends itself well to emotion-packed appeals.

Opponents of euthanasia claim that those who favor it wish to

play God and obtain a license to murder, while the accused';. in turn,
claim that their accusers go to great lengths to strip man of his last
vestiges of dignity during his dying days.

1

2

Even when these causes for confusion can be eliminated, a neat solution to the problem of euthanasia is not insured.

However, the issue

will receive clarification and allow those involved in decisions concerning the problem to think intelligently on the subject.

It is in

the hopes of doing this and providing a few guidelines within which to
operate that I now turn to the definition of euthanasia.
I.

Definition
Originally, euthanasia was defined and thought of as a happy

death.

Since death is inevitable, euthanasia, in the sense of being a

happy demise, was looked upon with favor and was indeed hoped for.

In

current usage, though, the term euthanasia, commonly called mercykilling, seems to bring to the minds of most people an unfavorable impression.

It is most generally taken to mean the deliberate killing of

persons for a wide variety of medical reasons.
Collegiate Dictionary defines euthanasia as

11

Webster's Seventh New

the act or practice of

killing individuals (as persons or domestic animals) that are hopelessly sick or inJjured for reasons of mercy. 11

This definition definately

narrows the acope of the previous one in which the broader interpretation allowed issues such as abortion to be considered under the title
euthanasia.

In this paper Webster's definition (confined to persons)

will be used as a starting point.
It will be helpful here, however, to make a further distinction
as to the definition.
passive euthanasia.

That is the distinction between active and
Active euthanasia is a deliberate and direct act

taken to terminate the life ef a hepelessly ill or injured person.

Passive euthanasia, on the other hand, is not taking the action needed
~o

keep a person alive and

1

ther.e~y,

indirectly aausing death. Giving a

fatal drug to a patient would be active euthanasia; while simply refusing to keep a patient on a respirator would be considered passive
euthanasia. 1
Joseph Fletcher has coined a new term for the case of passive euthanasia.

He uses the term 11 anti-dysthanasia 11 meaning the indirect

ending of a hard or bad death. 2
duced

b~t

only permitted.

In the later case death is not in-

Since I see no special value in using this

new term, the more common terms

11

active 11 and 11 passive 11 will be used in

this paper to distinguish the means through which euthanasia are
accomplished.
II.

History and Development of the Movement
Many people have the misconceived notion that euthanasia is a

new phenomena brought on solely by our tremendous technical advances,
but this is not so.

Euthanasia dates far back to primitive man and has

remained an unresolved problem up to this day.
Among certain primitive people, the killing or abandonment of
aged or helpless members of tribes was a common and accepted practiceo
The Hottentots, for example, were known to have carried their elderly
parents out into the bush where they would be left to die.

P. Caraman

writes of the Lapps that when their old folk were unable to trek the
For a case that concerns active and passive euthanasia see
Appendix, Item 1, the case of Missy. A more complete · disco.ssitm'. Wirth
reference to this case will be taken up below.
2 Joseph Fletcher, 11 Anti-Dysthanasia: The Problem of Prolonging
Death," Journal of Pastoral Care, (1964):7?-84.

4
mountains with their families, they were left behind unattended to die
in their tents.
turn.

The corpse froze and was buried upon the family's re-

Another method they used was to strap their old people to a

sleigh alive and shoot them down a snow-covered precipice into a fjord.
Practices very similar to these have been reported used by many other
primitive peoples including Eskimos.

It is thought that the old and

sick people in the societies whePe these practices were common began to
accept their end and submitted to it uncomplainingly.J
There are, however, some primitive societies which were known to
have had elaborate social codes which actually protected the
members of their tribes.

sen~or

Hospitality eastoms, property rights, and

food taboos reserving certain choice dished for the aged and helpless
were among some of the protections provided by these societies.
Settled agricultural communities showed the highest level of solicitude for their elderly members, and this is well exemplified by the
laws of the Hebrews in the Old Testament, forbidding the killing of
the 'innocent and just,' and in their general attitude of respect for
the old.
One of the important historical developments which is mentioned
in many discussions of euthanasia is the Hippocratic Oath. Many say
the oath expressly forbids any form of euthanasia. 4 Taken in its
expressed terms, though, it also forbids abortion and many common
practices of medicine today.

However, most medical students today

3Jonathan Gould and Lord Craigrcyle, Your Death Warrant? (New
Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1971), pp.20-29.
4For the content of the Hippocratic Oath see Appendix, Item 2.

5
take, not the original Hippocratic Oath, but a modified form which contains more general terminology and much more latitude in interpretation. 5
In short, people using the original Hippocratic Oath as a basis for
argument against euthanasia will have to be prepared to defend the accepted and widespread practices the oath would also forbid, and those
hiding in the protective ambiguity of the modified form have only their
subjectivity to rely on.
The situation in classical Greece and Rome concerning euthanasia
is not too clear, though the general attitude of the people toward
suicide indicates that euthanasia was accepted.

Suicide was an ac-

cepted form of death, especially in Rome, and was thought of very
often as the honorable way out.

Seneca the Younger stood firmly behind

this premise saying that 11 ••• just as a long drawn-out life does not
necessarily mean .- a better one, so a long drawn-out death necessarily
means a worse one. 116 This does not mean, however, that suicide did
not have any opposition, f'for it did, notably Cicero.

There seems to be

no real evidence that there was any policy of elimination for the sick
and elderly at this time, but infanticide was widely practiced and
met the approval of both Aristotle and Plato.

In Sparta, especially,

any weak or deformed babies were left exposed to the elements to die.
Another event in history that is used quite often in discussions
on euthanasia, this time by supporters, is the writing of Utopia by
Sir Thomas More (1478-1535),

11

the Catholic mercy-killer 11 •

More 1 s

5For the content of the modified form of the Hippocratic Oath,

see Appendix, Item 3.
6

Gould, Your Death Warrant?, p. 27.

6

Utopians allowed euthanasia as follows:
"As I have said, they treat the sick with great kindness
and leave nothing undone to restore their health, whether
it is by drugs or by dieting. If anyone is suffering from
an incurable disease, they consele him by sitting with him,
talking to him and supplying all the comforts they can. But
if a disease is not merely beyond treatment, but also a
constant source of pain and agony, the priests and magistrates
remind him that he is not up to all the tasks of life, is
troublesome to others and a burden to himself and is now
outliving his own death. Then they advise him not to resolve
to feed that pestilence and sickness any longer, nor to
hesitate to die, since life is a torment to him. They bid
him to take good hope and release himself from that bitter
life, as if from a prison or torture rack, or at least give
his permission for others to remove him. They tell him
that since he is going to put an end not to pleasure but to
punishment, he would be well advised to do it; and since
in that matter he is going to take the advice of priests, the
interpreters of God., his action will also be pious and holy.
Those who are persuaded by this either end their own lives
by abstinence from food, or ealse are released from it while
they are asleep, without any sensation of death. But they
never remove anyone against his will, nor are they any
the less considerate to him. It is considered honorable to
yield to persuasion and die like this. But they think a man
unworthy of burial or cremation who commits suicide without
having a reason approved of by the pr~ests and Senate. Instead~,7in great disgrace, he is flung unburied into some
bog." ·
This was certainly an unusual stand for a Catholic to take.

What

those who use this argument fail to realize, though, is that what More
was concerned with in his satire was to describe ar,non-Christian
society and to show how in many ways it was to be preferred to the
Renaci.ssancee:· societies of his own time.

He himself wrote that he only

explained and did not defend all the principles of the Utopian constitution.

Therefore, since More's stand on euthanasia cannetnbe , discerned,

the use of Utopia in arguments for or against euthanasia is invalid.
7sir Thomas More, Utopia.
Square Press, 1965) p. 88.

(New York, New York:

Washington

7
In 1873, L.A. Tollemache in an eloquent and persuasive article, 8
made a strong plea for the legislation of voluntary euthanasia.

The

problem with his plea was that the cases he considered severe enough
to merit euthanasia, were ones so severe that the patient could not
give consent.

Thus voluntary euthanasia was impossible.

A British

newspaper 9 called this problem to his attention, and Tollemache at once
issued an apologia statfumg that in cases where consent cannot be
obtained, a dying person showld be allowed to die a natural death.
This reversal did not, however, end the debate on euthanasia for
on October 16, 1931, Dr. C. Killick Millard, Medical Officer of Health
for the city of Leicester, in the Presidental Address to the Society of
Medical Officers of Health presented a plea for the legislation of
voluntary euthanasia.
Britain.

This was the birth of the euthanasia movement in

He asserted that the majority of people who die do so in

great pain and that increasing mortality from cancer would increase the
proportion of painful deaths.

He quoted at length from More's Utqpia.

In his speech Dr. Millard presented a long comparative study of the morals
of suicide and euthanasia.

He categorized suidide as an irrevocable

step in which one can be so easily mistaken.
111

He then stated that,

Legalised voluntary euthanasia would come into quite a different

category, as an act which was rational, courageous, and often highly
altruistic. 1 u 10
811 The New Cure of Incurables," Fortnightly Review 19. (873):218.
911 Mr. Tollemache and the Right to Die, 11 The Spectator 46. (1873):206.
10

c.

Health,"

K. Millard, "Address to the Society of Medical Officers of
Public Health. (November, 1931):3.5.

8

Dr. Millard introduced a draft bill entitled 11 The Voluntary Euthanasia (Legislation) Bill" and as a result of the support he received
established the Euthanasia Society in 1935.

Many distinguished people

were soon numbered among its members and its avowed objectives were:
••• to
adult
which
mercy
wish:

create a public opinion favorable to the view that an
person suffering severely from a fatal illness for
no cure is known, should be entitled by law to the
of a painless death if and when ti!t is his expressed
and to promote ~. lb.mms . . ih§gmslatool'il.~

After the first reactions to Dr. Millard's draft bill were felt
and after an ensuing debate, a second reading of the bill was refused
b,y a vote of 35 to 14.

Three years after the establishment of the Euthanasia Society in
Britain a similar society was established in America by Rev. Charles
Potter.

At first the Euthanasia Society of America proposed compulsory

euthanasia of monstrosities and imbeciles, but as a result of answers
to a questionaire addressed to physicians in the State of New York in
1941, decided to limit itself to voluntary euthanasia.
years, the society has grown from 600 to over 50,000.

In the last four
They have been

filling an unprecedanted number of requests for free copies of "A
. .
w·ll
~
• u12
L~vmg

Despite this growing interest in euthanasia, the movement was
dealt a blow in 1950 when the General Assembly,:· of the World Medical
Association approved a resolution recommending to all national associations that they 111 condemn the practice of euthanasia under any circumstances.1111J
11Gould, Your Death Warrant?

pp.25-26.

12The 11 Living Will" is not legally binding but seems to be making an
impression on medical staffs, since the will expresses the patient's
wishes. For its content see Appendix, Item 4.
1
3Gould, Your Death Warrant? P• 27.

9
This did not crush the movement for in 1952 a number of British and
American clergymen, doctors and scientists presented to the United
Nations a petition for the amendment of the Declaration on Human Rights
to provide for incurable sufferers the right of voluntary euthanasia.
It bore 2513 signatures, but an amendment was not passed.
Cur~ently

there have been several proposals made to different

state legislatures, and many figures such as Joseph Fletcher, Paul
Ramsey and Daniel Maguire have become prominent in the euthanasia movement.

These recent developments will be taken up later, after some of

the reasons for such a current interest in the movement are considered.
III.

The Urgency of Euthanasia
Currently, there seems to be an 11 urgency 11 concerning decisions

made about euthanasia.
factors:

This urgency has been attributed. to three main

(1) revolutionary developments in medical science, (2) the

laggardly state of the law, and (3) important shifts in moral outlook.
These factors will be discussed in subsequent sections of this
paper, but it will be helpful here to note the general population's
outlook on death and its awareness of the subject of euthanasia.
Daniel Maguire has said that, hopefully, a healthier attitude
toward death will emerge in our culture.

Previously British historian

Arnold Toynbee has charged that, 11 for Americans, death is un-American
and an affront to every citizen's inalienable right to life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness. 1114 Maguire agrees with him on this point.

naniel c. Maguire, Death~ Choice.
Doubleday and Company, 1974) p. 1 •
14

(Garden City, New York:

10
Man is the only animal who knows he is going to die.

Poets and

philosophers have proclaimed the significance of death-consciousness,
yet, it would seem the average person would rather forget it.
especially true if the average person is an American,

sine~

This is

in this

happiness-oriented land, death (outside of a military context) is seen
as something of an un-American activity. 15There seems to be, however,
a very recent change in outlook in our

coun~ry.

Harvard professor

Edwin Schneidman goes so far as to dub this the age of

de~th.

"In the Western World, 11 he writes, 11 we are more deathoriented today than we have been since the days of the Black
Plague in the 14th Century. There is a thanatology boom in ",'".
colleges and in print and there are random reports from the
lecture circuits tgat death is now outdrawing the perennials-sex and politics.
Despite this new outlook on death, 17 the topic of euthanasia as a
whole is still subterranean, and decisions are being made predominantly by thousands of doctors in millions of different situations and by
undefined, particulariz·e,Q., ad hoc criteria.

Bayless Manning, Stanford

law school dean, believes that a partial solution to this would be a
happily financed, well-managed, hard-working, yearly study meeting
which would bring together doctors, lawyers, moralists of every stripe,
insurance experts, nurses, social workers, morticians, sociologists,
gravely ill persons, clergymen, journalists, etc., to discuss the
current state of dying and publicize their results. 18

15Daniel c. Maguire, "Freedom to Die, 11 New Theology no.10.
York, New York: The Macmillian Company, 1973): 187.

(New

16
Edwin Schneidman, 11 The Enemy, 11 Psycbol agy Tada;v. (August, 1970): 37.
17This new outl~ok on death is a sign of gain and health and not of
decadence and morbidity, because it is only in a mature culture that death
can come of age and be received and accepted as a natural companion of life.
18
Maguire, Death nY Choice, P• 2.

11

Perhaps if Mr. Manning's suggestion was followed, and a report released, the public would at least
nasia and its urgency.

b~

more aware of the debate on eutha-

Most of the polls taken that deal with eutha-

nasia in the past have shown that the majority of the people has not
felt any real need as of yet to make a deQasion on this subject.
ever, the trend seems to be changing.

How-

A survey was conducted on the

campus of Ouachita Baptist University in Arkadelphia, Arkansas which
generally showed that some forms of voluntary euthanasia were favored,
and only a very small percentage of those surveyed ruled it out entirely or wanted it to be involuntary. 19
Public approval of the idea has increased sharply since a 1950
Gallup Poll, when 36 per cent of Americans said they approved of
euthanasia.

In a 1973 survey, 53 per cent expressed the view that

physicians should be allowed by law to end the life of the incurably
ill if the patient and family requested it.

A national poll conducted

by Life magazine in April, 1972 indicated' t~at 90 per c,ent of )the 4L,OOO
readers who returned the questionnaire felt that a patient with a
terminal illness should have the right to refuse treatment that would
attifically prolong life.

The Canadian Institute of Public Opinion

published results of a Gallup Poll in October, 1972, which indicated
that Canadian opinion over the years is swinging toward a permissive
attitude about mercy killing.

Some _?O_.year§ .;i.g6., 62 per cent of

19This survey was conducted by Michelle Wasson in 1974.

The contents
of the survey and the statistical breakdown can be seen in the Appendix,
Items 5 and 6.

12

Canadians were against euthanasia; today

52 per cent approve of a

doctor taking the life of a hopelessly ill patient, at the patient's
request. 20

IV·

Differing Perspectives on the Controversy
Medical perspectives
The accepted aim of medical pvactice has long been to fight death,

the enemy, with its complete power, and ease the suffering of the incurably ill as much as possible.

Given the situation that faced early

physicians it is no wonder the profession developed an ethic that
placed a preponderant emphasis on preserving life at all costs.

But as

of now, medicine is not at all sure who the enemy is.
Medicine, for the moment, suddenly finds itself bereft of an
agreed-upon definition of death.

Death is seen now not as a

but as a process and indeed a very changeable process.

11

moment 11

The traditional

medical standard of death, accepted by the law, has been the definition
of death in Black's Law Dictionary:
The cessation of life; the ceasing to exist; defined by
physicians as a total stoppage of the circulation of the
blood and a cessation of the animal and vital functions
consequent+. thereon, such as respiration, pulsation, etc.
Now that physicians can revive the heart after it has stopped
beating (heart-death) a new definition of death (brain-death) has
become ne:c essary.
Clinical death occurs in humans when the heart and lungs stop
functioning.

This deprives the brain of oxygen and, unless

20Eric Cameron, 11 Euthanasia:: Mercy or Murder? 11 , Liberty.
(November-December, 1975): 5.

13
resuscitation begins immediately, brain death follows, because the brain
cannot survive without oxygen and its tissues do not heal or regenerate
as other tissues do.

The brain dies in stages, beginning with the cerebral

cortex, then the mid-brain, and lastly, the brain stem.

Cellular death

follows, with organs and tissues remaining alive a bit longer.

The in-

terest in brain function has become more refined, but what has provided
a special urgency requiring immediate attention has been the parallel
development in highly complex techniques of organ transplantation.

Not

only does it become a matter of concern how long biological life should
be maintained artificially, if the brain has died, and at what social

costs, but, more specifically, in order to proceed with organ transplants,
there must be absolute clarity about when the donor is to be considered
legally dead.

Are some people to be considered more dead than others if

their organs are needed?

If a serious accident destroys a victim's

brain, but his basic functions are maintained artificially, does he
ever die?

In 1968 an

A£ Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to

Examine the Definition of Brain Death proposed criteria which would
enable a doctor t o pronounce a patient dead when the traditional signs of
death-respiratmry and circulatory failure were obscured by the resuscitation machinery.

"A Definition of Irreversible Coma 11 is as

follows:
1.

Unreceptivi ty and unres~onsitivity (that is, no response
even to painful stimuli).

2.

No muscular movement and no spontaneous breathing for at
leas.t one hour, or for three minutes if a mechanical
respirator is turned off.

3. No elicitable reflexes, ocular movements, or blinking,
and the presence of fixed, dilated pupils.

4. A flat isoelectric electroencephalogram (EEG).

14
No change when all of these tests are repeated at least
twenty-four hours later.

6. These criteria to be exclusive of two conditions:
hypothermia (body temperature below 90°F) or central
nerv~us syste~ depression due to drugs such as
barbJ.turates. 1·
Medical debate over this new definition of death appears to center
around the length of time that cessation of brain activity must continue before death can be certified,since it is possible for brain
wave activity to resume after it has stopped.

The question is especially

difficult where heart transplants are involved, for the organ must be
removed as soon as possible after death, and the twenty-four hours
specified in the Harvard definition may be too long a delay for the
heart to remain in usuable condition.
However, the terms 11 brain death 11 and 11 heart death 11 still suggest
an unsettling distinction, since there can be one without the other.
Cases have even been known where autopsy has later revealed that the
brain had been
tioning.

liqui~ied

while the heart and lungs were still func-

In some cases where the cerebal cortex has been destroyed,

the brain stem continues for a time to regulate heart and lung functioning.

BT. Julius Korein, Professor of Neurology at the New York University School of Medicine, makes a further distinction between brain
death (death of the entire brain including the brain stem) and cerebral death.

He concludeS. that when cerebral death has been determined,

21
Henry J. Cadbury, Lorraine K. Cleveland, John C. Cobb, Elizbeth
Conrad Corkey, Richard L. Day, John w. Elliot, J. Russell, and Joseph
Stokes, HhQ Shall Live? Man 1s Control~ Birth and Death. (New York:
Hill and Wang., 1970) p. 111.

15
the physician should pronounce the patient cerebrally dead and suggest
the discontinuation of cardiovascular and pulmonary support systems.
In other words, cerebral death is death.

It is his opinion that advance

in medicine has accelerated development of techniques that will allow
the physician to define and diagnose cerebral deatK with accuracy
and rapidity in an appropriate hospital setting.

If this is true, the

concept of cerebral death may be the best that can be done b,y way of
updating the detection of death.
The rapidity with which cerebral death can be determined will
help to solve the problem of potential organs available for transplant
being damaged beyond use by asphyxia.

The speed with which cerebral

death can be determined will allow organs to be removed more prompt?_l.y.:.:·f;c.Qlll
a donor.

Dr. Henry Beecher calculates that this would make available

in the U. S. each year over 10,600 kidneys for approximately 7,600 needy
kidney recipients and 6,000 livers for 4,000 potential liver recipients.
The speed and accuracy with which death can be determined is of
importance also to the issue of euthanasia.

For those cases where

cerebral death can be determined to have occurred, the turning off of
machines maintaining the vital signs need not be considered euthanasia.
Other problems have been created by our advanced medical technology.
One of these is the high cost of medical care.

There have been medical

cases reported in which patients with irreversible drain damage have
been maintained for up to eight years with tubes for feeding and release
of bodily wastes.
no mental response.

The patients were maintained in a state of absolutely
Expenses reached incredibly high proportions.

Had

the tube been taken away, many such patients would have died completely

16
within seventy-two hours.
A final consideration that the advent of medical technology has
brought upon us is the problem of allocation of medical resources.

If

diseases of the heart and cancer are brought under substansive control
and the process of aging could be manipulated, almost all death would
be accidental or intentional.

Given the track record of medica1 science,

it is not hard to believe that cancer and heart disease may some day be
curable.

Current research in aging also seems very promising.

These advances are also going to place a strain on the population
that one day might make it quite necessary to lay down a basis for
allocation of economic resources as between those of advanced age, those
who are younger, and those who are defective.

Sociologists are pre-

dicting that today 1 s "Y9uth culture" will have disappeared by the year
2000, when the Western

wor~

will be dominated by the middle-aged, and

pensioners will outnumber teen-agers.

The trend toward an aging

popula~

tion is already under way in the industrialized countries of the West,
the Communist world and Japan.

One cause is decreasing birth rates.

Another is that science has been increasing life expectancy with new
drugs that prevent the elderly from suocombing to once-fatal and common
diseases such as pneumonia.

The result is that we now have a medical

crisis because hospitals are unable to cope with all the chronically
ill old people suffering from cancer, heart trouble, strokes, etc. 22

22Eric Cameron, "Euthanasia:

Mercy or Murder?", p.3.
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Somewhere along the line a decision will have to be made as to who
gets the bed, the machine, the blood, and/or the care that cannot be
afforded everyone.

Currently patients who would be candidates for eu-

thanasia are using these resources, which in many cases could be much
more valuable used elsewhere.
Psycho] ogj cal perspectjyes_

The predicted psychological effect euthanasia would have on
patients and their families has been used as an argument against its
enactment.
It is thought by some that if euthanasia were practiced, some
persons, especially those who are elderly, would be afraid to enter the
hospital when in need of help.

If they were admitted and given medical

treatment under such circumstances, the psychological effect might be
the retardation of their recovery, even when no physical reason exists to
impede their improvement. 23 However, this argument is valid only in
cases of mandatory euthanasia and would not apply to voluntary euthanasia.
The psychological effect on a dying patient's family is tremendous.
For them there are long, torturing waits in depersonalized hospital
settings, heavy expenses to be met for medical treatment, grief for
their dying loved-one to be coped with and feelings of guilt that must
be allievated. 24 The question is, can they under such circumstances make

ZJRobert S. Mo1>:rd.e:op, 11 Dying, 11 Scientific American (September, 1973):

57.
24
For a very good discussion of the psychologicaa trauma . of the
dying patient and his family and how to deal with it, see Elizabmth
Kubler-Ross 1 book, .Qu Death and ~.

18

a rational decision regarding euthanasia when the patient cannot make his
own wishes known?

It is certain they cannot make the decision alone.

The physician must be relied upon to give his medical opinion as to the
patient's chances and to make the implications of the various alternatives open to the family as clear as possible.
Still the decision is not an easy one, and many conclude that such
a decision would be psychologically unbearable.

Since each person makes

decisions within his own, unique psychological perspectives, there
would seem to be a self-limiting factor on the problems he would encounter (i.e. those who would be unable to bear the psychological
burden would not opt for euthanasia).
Nevertheless, after the decision has been made, the questions may
still arise.

The family may wonder if their decision was really based

on the patient's well-being or on their own concerns.
Perspectjyes
The need for an accurate and speedy determination of death has
Le~al

already been considered.

Although most physicians believe that the

determination of death is a matter for legal decision and not codification by law, that codification would be necessary in order to protect
doctors from legal proceedings.

It would also be necessary in order to

determine when cases of stopping medical treatment fall under the
category of euthanasia.
Arguments against the legalization of euthanasia itself are based
on the predicted psychological effect discussed in the previous section
and on the grounds that euthanasia is morally wrong, which is the subject
of the next section.
There is, however, an argument for the legalization of euthanasia
that is set apart from the issue itself.

Legalization of euthanasia
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need not necessarily carry with it a commendation of the practice.
"Indeed, it is among other things, precisely the helpless
surrender to medical technology and management which the euthanasia movement attempts to counteract with its "living will"
and its deliberate confrontation with irreversible illness.
Advocates of euthanasia do not always in fact urge it as public
policy, but merely as a possible private alternative which should
be removed from the criminal category ••• Still, there is quite a
large leap from legally permitting some people to request that
their own lives not be unnecessarily prolonged by artificial
means to a public policy requiring all lives to be terminated
according to certain external criteria. Actually, euthanasia,
like abortion and contraception, might become a private matter
between the patient and his doctor. Large numbers of our citizens
might continue to think euthanasia a sin, as they might contraception and abortion, but they could no longer insist it was
a crime as well.25
There are at present bills for the legalization of euthanasia being
considered in many states, and some have been passed.

In Arkansas, a

patient now has the legal right to refuse medical procedures to extend
his life by signing a document similar to a will.

If the patient can-

not choose, the decision can be made by parents, spouse, children 18 and
older, or any other nearest living relative.

Two doctors must sign a

statement saying extraordinary means are necessary to prolong the
patient's life.

The attending physician is not liable for complying or
refusing to comply with the request. 26
Moral Perspectives
The French physician J. Hamburg has coined the dilema significantly
in the following quote:
Science has made us god before we are even worthy of
being man.

25sonya Rudikoff, 11 The Problem of Euthanasia, 11 Commentary (February,
1974) :66.
26This bill is HB 826 Act 879 sponsored by Henry Wilkins of Pine
Bluff and passed in March, 1977.
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Sentiment such as this seems to find expression among a great many.
Those who take the strongest stand against euthanasia often use as
the basis for their argument the llabsolute 11 priniple of the unconditional
inviolability of innocent human life.

Man seems to have a tendency to

consider the physical and biological to be ethically normative and
inviolable.
This is the basis of the official Roman Catholic opinion held in
regard to euthanasia.

It is stated, however, in the form of the tenth

commandment--THOU SHALT NOT KILL.

In 1957, Pope Pius XII gave a remark-

able address on the prolongation of life in which he referred to some
hopeless patients, whose soul may have left their body, by the ambiguous
but interesting term "virtually dead", and added that only ordinary means
need be used to perserve life. So perhaps the Roman Catholic view is not
so "unconditional" after all. 27
Maguire suggests that it is not so simple.
cannot simply be asserted as self-evident.

This absolute principle

The users of the principle

must bear the burden of proof, and the proof must come from whatever
moral meaning is to be found; that is, it must come from a knowledge of
the morally significant empirical data, the consequences, the existent
alternatives, the unique circumstances of person, place and time, etc.
11

To say that something · is morally right .·or wrong in all possible cir-

cumstances implies a divine knowledge of all possible circumstances
and their moral meaning .u 28

27For a general view of the Roman Catholic position see Appendix,
Item 7, interview with a Catholic priest in Arkadelphia, Arkansas.
28
Maguire, "Freedom to Die, 11 p. 194.
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Attempts have been made to base this principle on the predicted
consequences which would result should the principle be violated.

This

is the cracked dike argument, a kind of ethical domino theory which
says that if X is allowed., then Y and Z and everything else will be
allowed.

The deficiency in this themry is that it ignores the real

meaning of the real differences between X, Y, and

z.

It is, .:.t'urther... .

more, fallacious to say that if an exception is allowed, it will be
difficult to draw the line and therefore, no exception should be allowed.
Another expe9ted consequence that violation of this principle would
bring is a resultant lack of

t~e

awe for human life.

This is assuming

that anything which falls under our control and is subject to our own
understanding is less deserving of awe.

To the contrary, it might be

our involvement through the decision-making process, the use of our
own capabilities and responsible freedom, which would make us realize
more the awesomeness of real human life.
Harmon Smith says that Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Karl Barth are
representative of those Protestant theologians who hold that it is for
God alone to make an end to hunan life and that any direct action taken
against the lives of the sick or incurably infirm is tantamount to
murder.
Bonhoeffer considers the question in his work, Ethics, of whether
it is permissable to destroy painlessly an innocent life which is no
longer worth living.

Bonhoeffer's answer is that "the question regarding

euthanasia must be answered in the negative. 1129 The two assumptions
../

29Dietriech, Bonhoeffer, Ethics. Edited by Bethge Eberhard.
York: MacMillian Press, 1965) p. 121.

(New
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Bonhoeffer ' eperates from are (1) that God alone has power over life and
death and (2) all and any life is worth living.

Smith also points out

that Bonhoeffer doubtless knew of the systematic extermination of certain
classes of peoples in Germany in the 1930's and 1940's, and this may
largely account for the absolutely uncompromising position which he took
regarding euthanasia.

Yet Bonhoeffer was not so uncompromising as some

betray him to be for he also says in Ethics that,

11

If a sufferer from

incurable disease cannot fail to see that his care must bring about the
material and psychological ruin of his family, and if he, therefore, by
his own decision frees them from this burden, then no doubt there are
many objections to such unauthorized action; and yet here too a condemnation will be impossible."JO
Karl Barth treats the subject of abortion in his Church Dogmatics
and makes an exception in his condemnation of it only when two lives,
that of the mother and the child, are in conflict.

Concerning euthan-

asia, however, Barth says another life is not in competition with that of
the patient and, therefore, he maintains that there is no alternative
but to respect life by preserving it.

He feels euthanasia can be re-

garded only as murder, i.e., as a wicked usurpation of Dod's sovereign
right over life and death.

Barth admits that "tempting questions" are

raised but says, "The central insight in this whole complex of problems
is that it is for God and God alone to make an end of human life, and

JOJohn D. Bennet, "The Van Dusens' Suicide Pact," Christianity and
Crisis. (March 31, 1975): 68.
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that man should help in this only when he has a specific and clear
mand from God 11 3i

com~

Barth leaves open the possibility of such a command.

What the question really seems to come down to, though, is what
constitutes real human life?

The termonology 11 quality of life" as

opposed to "quantity of life" is used quite often.

Although these phrases

have a certain emotive appeal, they have no clear-cut definitions.

The

quality of life is what would be considered 11 real 11 human life, while
quantity of life is continued through biological vitality.

Is merely

physical vegetative life sacred, or is it life that is actually or potentially personal that is sacred?
even be considered life.

In fact, should biological vitality

MUch discussion revolves around the question

of when man is dead; perhaps it should be asked when does man stop
living?

Should our aim be to preserve life at all costs?

these questions we must consider

To answer

what constitutes life, when saving

of life really becomes a torturing of it, and if man can legitimately
exercise any control over the manner and time of his death.
Life and death have traditionally been considered only from a
biological standpoint in cases of euthanasia because it is in these
terms that life and death can be more easily measured.

Life and

death in this sense are directly opposing one another--life being the
"summon bonum" and death a thing to be fought at all costs.
15:26 depicts death as the last enemy left to conquer.
however, that the death meant here is biological death?

I Corinthians

Is it fair to S<J.y,
There are

biblical passages which are used to support biological vitality as the

31 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics.

(Illinois:

Allenson, 1936) p. 210.
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criterion of life.

Two such ones are Deuteronomy 12:23 and Leviticus

17:14 which intertwine life and blood so closely that is seems they cannot be separated.

Pliny shows in Natural History how the two were so

closely equated that epileptics would quaff the warm blood of a freshly
killed gladiator to alleviate their condition.
Harmon Smith

sa~,

Blood is preconditional to life, but man does not live
by blood· alonel More to the point, if what we conventionally
mean by human life is no more than biological vitality, I
would argue that man does not live by life alone. It is no
abuse of the gospel to paraphrase Jesus in this way; and neither
is it inconsistent with his proclamation that a man's life
does not consist in his posessions, that we require more than
bread for life, and that the "abundant life" does not denigrate
but nevertheless transcends mere physical existence.n32
11

Itwould be difficult on the basis of biblical evidence to simply
affirm the lowest, common natural denominator, namely vitality, as life.
The biological aspects need not be diminished, but neither should they be
made solely determinative of human life and death.

To differientate

human life and death from that of plant and animal we must give it some
significance not common to the rest.
Even when we should be able to satisfactorily determine what constitutes life there comes the question of when in our treatment of a
patient are we prolonging life and when we are prolonging death.
of

suffer~ng

Relief

and prolongation of life are not necessarily complementary

and often come into conflict.

Joseph Fletcher regards the issue of eu-

thanasia not as one of life or death, but as one of which kind of death,
an agonized or a peaceful one.

32Harmon L. Smith, Ethics and the New Medicine.
Abingdon Press, 1970) p. 125.

(Nashville:
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Harmon Smith points out that the Hippocratic Oath does not say that
life is the "summon bonum", but that the patient's well-being is.
are often not the same thing.

These

Can we say that doctors who will not let

hopelessly ill patients die are aggressors against the well-being of the
patients, the patient's family, and all their resources so long as the
patient's death is artificially postponed?
We are still faced with the question of whether or not man can
legitimately exercise a control over the manner and time of his death.
Most agree that there is a fitting time to die, but will not say when
that time is unless in retrospect.

In other words, people are willing

only to look back and say that it was his time to die.
Christians have typically held the belief that life is a gift from
God and therefore ultimately his.

Moreover, belief in the sovereignty

of God has caused Christians to ascribe the entire spectrum of events,
from life to death, to God's causative will.

All of the good as well as

the bad, including the contrdictions inderent in each, have been interpreted with a cause-and-effect correlation between God's will and human
events.

This reasoning equates what is "natural" with God's will.

Joseph Fletcher says, "We are not as persons of moral stature to be
ruled by ruthless and unreasoning physiology but rather by reason and
self-control."

He maintains that the supreme value of life is person-

ality and that we should in no way subordinate ourselves to natural law.
He adds that our "customary morality"

destroys human freedom and dis-

torts human knowledge and thereby deprives man of the capacity to be a
man.33

JJibid., p. 163.
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Fletcher uses these concepts of

11

customary morality 11 and human free-

dom in his discussions concermng active and 'passive euthanasia.

He<sig'ni-

fies "act" as personal and professional interference with natural processes.
Correspondingly 11 omission 11 is the ahdication of further personal and professional responsibility to a vague kind of naturalistic determinism.
We have again arrived back to submission to natural processes and this
approach has long been the modus operandi of Western law and medicine,
and often theology as well.

The question is whether it should continue

to be so.
I would again refer you to the case of Missy.34 In consider&ng
her case, compare the desirability of death by active means as opposed
to passive means.

11

Though omission and commission are different

realities with a potential for different moral meaning, they have a · .;. _, ,
suggestive similarity in that in both cases, someone is dead who
would have been alive it a different decision had been made. 11 35

F±~t~he~ maintains that the goal, motive and foreseeable consequences in both forms, the direct and indirect voluntary courses of
action, are the same:

i.e., the death of the patient.

"Because of these

common ethical factors, I am personally unable to see any real ethical
difference betwe·e n' ;the~ ·"fl.li9, but there are other moral theologians who
profess to find a difference, because the means employed are different. 11 36

34see Appendix, Item 1.
35Maguire, Death ~ Choice, p. 13.
36 Joseph Fletcher,
Death, 11 p. 78.

11

Anti-Dysthanasia:

The Problem of Prolonging .

27
He sees the difference between doing nothing to keep a patient alive and
giving a fatal dose of a pain-killing or other lethal drug as being a
very cloudy one, because in both cases the decision is "morally deliberate."
Paul Ramsey says that, of course, the intention is the same either
way--meaning the end in view.

But he disagrees with Fletcher's assertion

that the means employed in both instances have the same moral meaning.
He sees no problem with the ethical validity of willing the end for euen
in the strictest religious ethics, "the desire for death can be licit. 11 37
He still, however, sees great moral difference in how that end : is
accomplished.
Fletcher makes the statement in the course of his argument that,
11

as Kant said, if we will the end, we will the means. 11 3B This is a

statement from Kant's analysis of hypothetical imperatives, ..which are
dependent on consequences.

Ramsey answers in this way:

One could argue that if. one wills the end he wills the
means--but not, just any o1ntmeans ••• One could say that there
are different means--and differences between action and omissions
that make room for properly aaring actions--that may let the
patient have the death he not ~mproperly or even quite rightly
desireso While it might be argued that the Kantian maxim
applies to means necessary to secure a desired and desirable
end, still where there are more than one means to this same
end, to will that end leaves open the choice among means. A
means may be right, another wrong, to the same end.39

37Gerald Kelly, 11 The Duty of Using Artificial Means of Preserving
Life," Theological Studies 11 (June, 1950): 217.
8
3 Joseph Fletcher, "The Patient's Right to Die, 11 Harper's (October,
1960): 143.
39Paul Ramsey, The Patient S2 Person.
Press, 1970) p. 153.

(New Haven:

Yale University
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v.

Conclusion
It is obvious by now that euthanasia has been spoken to by a

variety of persons--physicians, nurses, theologians, philosophers, politicians, scientists, population experts, lawyers, psychologists, the
aged, the sick--in a variety of ways on many different levels. Daniel
40
Maguire suggests our nation's priori ties are out. of place,
and Harmon
Smith says,

11

It is important that all the variables in the mix be self-

consciously sorted out, assessed, and assigned a place of relative
priority according to their respective bearing on the decision-making
moment. 1141
This, to me, seems to be our job.

We must sort out the arguments

concerning euthana§ia which are invalid or irrelevant and consider these
which are relevant and valid.

In this light, several observations can

be made:
(1)

It is easy to confuse arguments for the necessity of
euthanasia, such as those concerning our limited medical
resources and the need for organs for transplanting and for
the 11 moral validity 11 of euthanasia,

(2)

Medical knowledge and technology are invaluable in
accurately determining death, and assessing extraordinary means and patient conditions. These considerations, however, deal with the classification
of patients and the implementation~ of _euthanasia-not with the rightness or wrongness of the act.

(3) The psychological consequences of euthanasia do bear
on its validity. However, for the reasons that have
already been considered, I believe the evidence to be

40
41

Maguire,
smith,

11

Freedom to Die, 11 p. 194.

~cit., p. 156,
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to the contrary that the psychological risk involved
is too great. Risk always exists when man has the
freedom of choice. Careful regulation can minimize
that risk, and there are appropriate and effective
means of dealing with that risk when it is realized.
(4)

Neither can the state of the law be used as argument
for or against euthanasia, because the law does not
determine rightness or wrongness. Legislation reflects what we decide to be right on moral grounds.
At least this is how it should be in the ideal situation. Our job, then, includes working for the
legislation that would be the normal outcome of our
conclusion regarding euthanasia.

We are left now with the moral deliberations concerning euthanasia.
I think we can draw some logical conclusions from the evidence that has
been presented in this paper.

First of all, prolongation of life should

not be in all cases our supreme goal.

It is very hard to determine when

prolongation of life ends and prolongation of death begins.

Secondly,

it is not so important that we determine the point between the two, when
we regard the patient's well-being as our greatest concern.
cases, the patient's

well~being

In some

will even be in direct conflict with

prolongation of life, especially when that life is considered the mere
biological vitality common to all organisms.

When a person has lost

those characteristics which make him a person and distinguish his life
from that of other animals and vegetables, then his demise is justifiable
on the same grounds used to justify, say for example, the demise of an
injured and suffering horse.

If we then can concede that we do have the

right to exercise control over ourselves, we neeanot yield ourselves
to natuv.al process.

(In actuality, we interfer with natural process all

the time eonsidering that medical treatment of any kind changes or reverses the process.)
morally valid end.

Therefore, I would conclude that euthanasia is a

}0

We still must decide on the issue of active euthanasia.

Gerald

Ke·l ly has said and has been verified by virtually everyone, that the
desire for death is licit.
will tne end.

Kant has said as we will the means ,-.·::Wer·

Since we have said that we need not yield ourselves to

natural processes, why not active euthanasia?

Ramsey's point is that

when there are other than 11 active 11 means available, these other means
are to be preferred since his concern is the best care for the dying
patient.

I would agree with him that in most cases active euthanasia

would be "unnecessary" and even 11 unpreferable" , but perhaps not immoral.
But I also suspect on the basis of Ramsey's admition that it might be
argued that the Kantian maxim does apply to means "necessary" to secure
the desired end, that in cases where active euthanasia is necessary to "
secure the desired end, the patient's well-being, that even he would
agree to its implementation.

Therefore, I would also conclude that

active means, when they are most in line with the patient's well-being,
are morally valid means to the morally valid end.
In closing, I would say that the conclusions I have drawn, while
I think them to be legitimate, are nevertheless, just
Each person must draw his own conclusions.

~

conclusions.

Joseph Fletcher

sums~ it

up

like this:
••• man's moral stature, his quality as a moral being, depends first upon his possession of freedom of choice and,
second, upon his knowledge of the courses of action open
to his choice. In a very real sense it is possible to regard freedom and knowledge as different sides of one prerequisite to ethical living, namely control of self and
circumstances. 2

42 Joseph Fletcher, Morals and Medicine.
University Press, 1954) p. 100.

(Princeton:

Princeton
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Thus, to put it in Fletcher's terms, once we have given an individual
the knowledge of the courses of action open to his choice, we must give
him the freedom to make that choice in order for him to live ethically.

APPENDIX
Item 1--The Case of Missy
Dr. Warren Reich, a senior research associate at the Kennedy Center for Bioethics at Georgetown University, posed a difficult case at the
meeting of the International Congress of Learned Societies in the Field
of Religion in September, 1972. The case involved a girl (Missy) who was
born with spina bifida with meningo~elocele of the lumbar spine. Spina
bifida refers to an opening in the spine and meningomyelocele is a condition in which portions of the spinal cord, as well as meninges and
spinal fluid, have slipped out through the spinal opening and are enclosed in a sac. The child lacked reflex activity in both legs and
could not control her anal or urinary sphincters. She had club feet.
Hydrocephalus, "water on the brain 11 , develops in 90% of these cases.
To treat that, a 11 shunt 11 has to be surgically inserted to drain the
cerebrospinal fluid from the brain into the heart or peritoneum. Even
with a shunt, the child would have a 50:50 chance of being mentally retarded. Missy's complications might eventually require a surgical procedure which would allow her urine to drain into a bag which she would
wear on her abdomen permanently. Bowel control would be a lifelong pro~
blem for her. Kidney failure is a constant danger and the most common
cause of death for children with this affliction. Broken bones and
burns are the frequent lot of such children also, due to problems in
mobility and sensation.
In the panel dicussion of this case, Dr. Harmon Smith of Duke
University Divinity School noted that until ten years ago, about 80% of
such babies died. t c'J:oday, 75% survive. Thus, again, medical advance
brings on troubling new moral questions. Should this baby have been
allowed to die from the meningities that would normally ensue in such
cases? Or should the medics have begun at once what would be for the
child a lifetime of extraordinary care? The panel at the congress (which
along with Reich and Smith, included Dr. Eric Cassell of Cornell University Medical College) considered only these two options.
In the discussion, it was suggested to the panel that there were
options, such as the direct termination of life. This was an option
that no member of the pa!lel would even consider. 11 I find it is
absolutely incredible, even in a mere debate, to consider this a serious
alternative in a group of moralists and theologians, 11 said Professor
Smith. The other panelists agreed that this line should never be crossed.
A very fair question of course is why? Why is it so clear that these
two alternatives exhaust the moral possibilities of the described case
and that the path of direct termination is beyond the pale?
First of all, it is not clear that meningitis would be an efficient
11 friend 11 •
As Dr. Reich pointed out, babies have been known to survive
the meningitis and live a number of years without being aware of anything
and requiring a great amount of physical care. Thus the problem could
be intensified by mere omission and reliance on the disease to achieve
the desired results. Furthermore, as one of the doctors in the audience
pointed out in this discussion, death by meningitis in such cases is not
normally serene. It is not really a neat solution. Disease in this
instance may not come to the aid of ethics.
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There can be good reasons offered to keep a child like this alive.
Advances are being made in the treatment of nearly all the symptoms of
this affliction. It may even be argued that if people do not take a
chance on life for such children, medicine will not be able to learn
all that it needs to conquer and prevent this disorder. It may be further argued that we should be extremely cautious about opting for death
for a hhild. Caution is further indicated b,y the basic fact that a
decision is being made for another person.
Given the realities of the case as described, however, it is
possible that death might be seen as preferable to the kind of life
this child could have. The moral question then is whether it could be
brought on by the administration of drugs or whether a compromise could
be found whereby the drugs are used to comfort and to weaken in coordinatination with the meni~tis. In the present state of legal and
moral debate, the latter possibility would offer the advantage of protective ambiguity. There is no precise way ~f knowing whether a drug is
accelerating death as it relieves discomfort since the unrelived discomfort might accelerate death too and since the degree of immunity to
the drug is a variable. Still, this flight to ambiguity,would represent a retreat from the question to be explored--Can it be moral and
should it be legal to take direct action to terminate life in certain
circumstances.
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Item 2--The Hippocratic Oath
I swear b.Y Apollo the physician and Aesculapius and health and allheal and all the gods and goddesses that according to my ability and
judgment I will keep this oath and this stipulation--to reckon him who
taught me this art equally dear to me as my parents, to share my substance
with him and relieve his necessities if required, to look upon his offspring in the same footing as my own brothers and to teach them this art
if they shall wish to learn it without fee or stipulation and that b.Y
precept, lecture, and every other mode of instruction I will impart a
knowledge of the art to my own sons and those of my teachers and to
disciples bound b.Y a stipulation and oath according to the law of
medicine but to none others. I will follow that system of regimen which,
according to my ability and judgment, I consider for the benefit of my
patients, and abstain from whatever is deleterious and mischievous. I
will give no deadly medicine to ~yone if asked nor suggest any such
counsel, and in like manner I will_not give to a woman a pessary to
produce abortion. With purity and with holiness I will pass my life and
practice my art. I will not cut persons laboring under the stone but
will leave this to be done b.Y men who are practitioners of this work.
Into whatever houses I enter, I will go into them for the benefit of the
sick and will abstain from every voluntary act of mischief and corruption, and further, from the seduction of females or males, of freemen and slaves. Whatever, in qmnnection with professional practice, or
not in connection with it, I see or hear, in the life of men, which
ought not to be spoken of abroad, I will not divulge as reckoning that
all such should be kept secret. While I continue to keep this oath
unviolated, may it be granted to me to enjoy life and the practice of the
art, respected b,y, .all mem at all times, but should I trespass and
violate this oath, may the reverse be my lot.
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rtem 3--The Hippocratic Oath in Modified Form
I solemnly pledge myself to consecrate my life to the service of
humanity. I will give to my teachers the respect and gratitude which is
their due; I will practice my profession with conscience and dignity;
the health of my patient will be my first consideration; I will respect
the secrets with are confided in me; I will maintain by all means in
my power the honor and the noble traditions of the medical profession;
my colleagues will be my brothers; I will not permit considerations of
religion, nationality, race, party politics, or social standing to
intervene between my duty and my patient; I will maintain the utmost
respect for human life, from the time of conception; even under threat,
I will not use my medical knowledge contrary to the laws of humanity.
I make these promises solemnly, freely and upon my honor.
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Item 4--Living Will
TO MY FAMILY, MY PHYSICIAN, MY CLERGYMAN, MY LAWYER-If the time comes when I can no longer take part in decisions for rolf
own future, let this statement stand as the testament of my wishes:
If there is no reasonable expectation of
or mental disability,

rolf

recovery from physical

I,
request that I be allowed to die and not be kept alive by artificial
means or heroic measures. Death is as much a reality as birth, growth,
maturity and old age--it is the one certainty. I do not fear death as
much as I fear the indignity of deterioration, dependence and hopeless
pain. I ask that medication be mercifully administered to me for
terminal suffering even if it hastens the moment of death.
This request is made after careful consideration. Although this
document is not legally binding, you who care for me will, I hope, feml
morally bound to follow its mandate. I recognize that it places a
heavy burden of responsibility upon you, and it is with the intention of
sharing that responsibility and of mitgating any feelings of guilt that
this statement is made.
Signed -------------------------Date ----------------------Witnessed by
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Item 5--Survey Conducted by Michelle Wasson
1. Which best defines your concept of human life?
A. A body that performs the fundamental processes through artificial
means and the brain is virtually 11 dead 11 and no thinking or lea.rl.'iing or communicating takes place.
b. A body that performs the fundamental processes on its own, but
the brain is virtually "dead" and no thinking or learning takes
place.
c. A body that can perform its fundamental processes on its own,
can participate normally in day to day activities and has some
degree of intelligence and comprehension.
2.

A patient with incurable cancer is slowly dying but because of a good
heart he may live several weeks. He has developed a toleration to
the medicine that eases the pain. A doctor cuts off his intravenous
feedigg and the patient died in several hours. Do you agree with
what the doctor did?
b. Dasagree
a. Agree

).

Do you believe in "mercy killing?"
a. Yes
b.

No

4. The parents of a mongoloid baby (severe mental retardation) requiring surgery for survival refused to give permission. It took
the baby 15 days to die.
a. Should the parents have been made to take the child home and
bear the pain of standing the death watch?
b. Should the state have taken legal charge of the baby from the
parents and then authorized the pperation?
c. Should a court order have overruled the parents' decision?
d. Should a speeding up of death have taken place such as increasing
the dosage of medicine been added to the lack of an operation?

5. Do you believe in •••
a.
b.
c.

6.

indirect euthanasia (mercy killing)--such as not using any
artificial means to keep someone alive and letting nature take
her course?
direct euthanasia--doing something to speed up the dying process?
both

A diabetic patient who has been using insulin for years and who
deirelO.ps an i':hn~pe:.dit~l:e. ·" and very painful kind of cancer can continue
to use insulin and may live many months in agony. By discontinuing
the insulin the patient would lapse into a coma and die painlessly.
If you were the doctor would you continue or discontinue the insulin?
a. Continue
b. Discontinue

?. Would you believe in

g~v~ng an overdose of medicine so a patient would
die quickly rather than slowly dying for days or weeks in pain?
a. Yes
b. No
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Item 5--Continued
8.

Do you think the parents of a Mongoloid child should place it in an
institution where it would be with children of the same condition
or take care of it at home where the parents could take care of it
even if there were other children in the family?
a. at an institution
b. at home

9. Would you believe in the 11 mercy killing 11 of a baby who has severe
brain damage?
a. Yes
b. No
10. Would you shoulder the responsibility of caring for a child who is
accutely deformed, or unable to progress beyond the mentallity of a
totally dependant infant?
a. Yes
b. No
11.

A preacher's son was born physically frail and severely braindamaged because its oxygen was shut. of!. in' the womb. The doctor
says the child will be close to an inanimace object. The doctor
suggested action--taking away of oxygen--that implied if the baby
could not survive on his own, h'e should not live at all. The
father agreed. How do you feel about his decision?
a. Strongly against
d. Moderately for
b. Moderately against
e. Strongly for
c. Indifferent or neutral

12. What is your opinion of mercy killing?
a. It is o.k. to do it indirectly--not using artificial means to
keep a person alive.
b. It is o.k. to do it directly by giving an overdose, etc.
c. Both a and b.
d. It is murder.
13.

If you were in an accident that caused severe brain damage which
made you totally dependant on others and your bodily functions had
to be carried on by artificial means would you look with favor on
someone relieving you of your life?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Undecided

14.

If you were in an accident and your life was totally dependent on
a machine and another person needed one of your organs to survive
would you choose
a. to stay alive with the help of the machine(s).
b. to have someone 11pull the plug 11 so the needy person could have
your organ.
c. undecided.
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Item 6--Results of the Survey
OVERALL RESULTS OF SURVEY

1. a-2.27% b-21.27% c-95.45%
2. a-45.45%

~54.54%

3. a-59.05% b-34.09% ?-6.8%
4. a-13.6% b-27.27% c-11.3% d-27.27% e-20.43%
5. a-59.09% b-11.36% c-28.45% 1-9.09%
6. a-50.0% b-47.72% ?-2.27<%>
7. a-29.54% b-70.45%
8. a-78.18% b-22.72%
9. a-34.09% b-61.36% ?-4.54%
10. a-59.09% b-34.09%

?~6.818%

11. a-4.54% b-13.6% c-13.6% d-59.09% e-6.818%
12. a-59.09% b-2.27% c-18.18% d-18.18% ?-4.54%
13. a-45.45% b-13.6% c-40.9%
14. a-11.36% b-40.9% c-47.72%
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Jtem ?--Interview with Father Cooper of St. Mary's Catholic Church in
Arkadell?hia. Arkansas
Father Cooper said that the Roman Catholics were, of course,
against what is commonly called mercy killing simply because it is the
taking of a life, and no one has the right to take a life for any reason
except God. It's like abortion in that we consider it murder. I think
our ideas are based on logic. The reasoning is there that the enS
might be good in cases of euthanasia, such as ones where a poor guy is a
vegstable or something like that. But the means to accomplish this end
would be bad and therefore would make the whole act bad. You can't use
evil means to accomplish a good end. OUr contention is that only God
gave life and only God can take life. When we start saying who can
live, we 1 re like Hitler. Eet 1 s face it, soon it would be unproductive
people or people who couldn't meet up to certain standards that would be
put to death like they were in Hitler's concentration camps. As I said
our basic contention is that euthanasia is murder because no one has the
right to take life except God.
Now that could bring up the question of capital punishment and why
the Catholics haven't taken such a strong stand on it as they have things
like abortion. Well, we don't approve of it in a sense, but we uphold the
right of the state to put someone to death who has committed a serious
crime. We uphold the right of the state according to the will of the
people. We're neither for or against it so to speak. In other words, it
is just up to the people. If they want capital punishment, okay. And if
they do we at least say the state does have a right to put someone to
death who has committed a serious crime such as the taking of a life.
However, I don 1 t think the same thing holds for euthanasia for it is :!·· ·.
different from capital punishment. And when you think about it, God
may have some purpose for the life that is inflicted with disease and
retardation. I think a good Christian person can see good in everything and such a person could be a blessing in disguise. Basically,
that's our stand.
There are a lot of practical considerations such as the great
expense involved in a long hospital stay. We are not morally obJigated
to keep a person alive by- cxtr.a"Or·tjj:J.1ary · :r.1eans. -: I' thi;ok we have to ta:ke
a neutral ground here. We can't say what is right or wrong in these
cases, but I do not think this is so much mercy killing as just letting
nature take its course. Personally, when I die I want to aie by natural
means, but I don't want to be kept alive by artificial means. But we
have to be careful when we talk about extraordinary means because
certainly a little bit of glucose would be far from extraordinary
means.
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